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SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: IS THERE AN ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THEY RECEIVE
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES?
SARAH TURK
I. INTRODUCTION
Derrick S1 is a victim of a broken system even though he is a sexually violent predator.
He was a member of a gang, forced to participate in gang rape in order to stay in the gang and fit
into the street lifestyle. At the time he was only seventeen but already had a string of violent
crimes as part of his record. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison and on the day he was
released, was transferred to a facility that houses sexually violent predators and has remained at
the facility for nearly thirteen years. Derrick S. actively tries to seek mental health treatment in
order to complete the steps on the road to recovery but remains stuck in the facility. A number of
factors work against him: the stigma that is attached to the label of sex offender, lack of
treatment, and a lack of focus within the academy on issues of bioethics as they relate to mental
health law. These three shortcomings create a situation in which sex offenders could be
committed indefinitely with little if any treatment in a broken system with few people advocating
on their behalf for changes in the system and greater access to the mental health services that
these men desperately need.
In this paper I will examine the mental health services individuals committed under
sexually violent predator (SVP) statutes receive during their commitment. In order to evaluate
those services and how we view the adequacy of the mental health services these men receive,
Part One will look at the O’Connor v. Donaldson2 case which set the standard for what could be

1

Name has been changed, as this individual is currently involved in a call action lawsuit seeking
to improve mental health treatment at the SVP facility in New Jersey.
2
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 563 (1975).
1

called “traditional” civil commitment3. For a point of comparison, Part Two will focus on the
history of SVP acts and highlight the different types of mental health programs that exist in the
country. Part Three will examine how the field of bioethics has largely shied away from mental
illness due to the conflicting nature of autonomy and protectionism. Part Four will delve into
how bioethics should be tackling the issue of mental health and mental illness and highlight how
bioethics should evaluate the state and mental health services received by those men4 committed
under SVP statutes. This final section will also highlight critiques of the SVP statute and
treatment paradigm, taking into account arguments against treatment such as societal protection
and funding issues. This section concludes that with the expansion of the power5 to commit these
individuals, we are ethically obligated to provide mental health services that seek to treat the
diseases that afflict these individuals.
II. HISTORY OF TRADITIONAL CIVIL COMMITMENT
The power to commit someone against his will to an institution for the treatment of a
mental disorder is based on two main principles of Western legal tradition: parens patriae (the
theory that the sovereign acts in the best interests of subjects who are unable to act for
themselves6) and the state's police power.7 Involuntary civil commitment is the process by which

3

Traditional in this context refers to commitment in a state against an individuals will when that
individual is found to be mentally ill and to be a danger to themselves or others. This is in
contrast to an SVP act which hinges on a criminal conviction of a sex offense.
4
In the state of New Jersey all the individuals that have been committed to the treatment facility
in Avenel, NJ have all been male. Additionally, according to Biennial Report Regarding the
Council on Sex Offender Treatment September 1, 2008 – August 31, 2010, all 175 SVPs were
male.
5
US v. Comstock held that a federal statute allowing a district court to order the civil
commitment, beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released, of a sexually dangerous
federal prisoner was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (176), (2010). This creates an a federal system of commitment of
sexually violent predators in addition to state statutes.
6
Robert I. Simon, M.D., Clinical Psychiatry and the Law 1,158 (2d ed. 1992).
2

an individual may be committed to an inpatient mental health facility against his will by a judge,
usually upon a showing that the individual is dangerous to himself or others, (police power).
Alternatively, the state’s parens patriae authority is derived from English law, which, at the time
of the settling of the American colonies, gave the King, as sovereign, the responsibility for the
care and custody8 of “all persons who had lost their intellects and become incompetent to take
care of themselves.”9 Together these two theories create a legal process that is controlled by state
statute and affords considerable due process protection10 to the individual in question. For
example, in order for the state to commit someone under the police power theory of
commitment, the state must show by at least clear and convincing evidence11 that the individual
suffers from a mental illness and is dangerous to himself or others.12
One of the first cases to deal with the constitutionality of the civil commitment process
was O’Connor v. Donaldson, decided in 1975.13 The Donaldson case was an action against the
superintendent of a mental hospital and others for allegedly wrongfully confining the plaintiff for
fifteen years. The Supreme Court held for the first time that “a State cannot constitutionally
confine without more a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.”14 The

7

Veronica J. Manahan, When Our System of Involuntary Civil Commitment Fails Individuals
with Mental Illness: Russell Weston and the Case for Effective Monitoring and Medication
Delivery Mechanisms, 28 Law & Psychol Rev. 1,1 (2004).
8
Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment without Psychosis: the Law’s Reliance on the Weakest
Links in Psychodiagnosis, 1 Journal of Sexual Offender Civil Commitment: Sci & L., 1, 17-82
(2005).
9
Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill ,87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190. 88,
(1974).
10
Id. at 88
11
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)
12
Manahan, supra n.7 at 4.
13
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 563(1975).
14
Donaldson 422 U.S. at 576.
3

evidence showed that Donaldson's confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care,
not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.15 The Court stated that even
if Donaldson's original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, it could
not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed because due process required the
state to do more.16 Essentially the court was pointing out that if the reason for civil commitment
was for Donaldson to receive treatment and he received the treatment curing him of his original
illness that was reason for confinement, his confinement was no longer constitutional because he
could not be labeled mentally disordered. In fact, in the Donaldson case, the evidence at trial
showed that “testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction, that Donaldson had
posed no danger to others during his long confinement, or indeed at any point in his life.”17 The
decision in Donaldson established that the only constitutionally recognized grounds for
involuntary commitment are preventing injury to the public, ensuring the mentally ill person's
own survival or safety, or alleviating or curing the mental illness.18 The court was very careful to
say that there was no constitutional right to treatment while committed.19
This paper will not address the advisability of involuntary civil commitment. The goal of
this paper is to highlight the stigma of sexual deviance associated with individuals confined
under an SVP act for indefinite commitment, lack of treatment, and a void in bioethical
understanding of mental health issues. However, when the traditional civil commitment system is
utilized appropriately, such that an ill and dangerous individual is committed to an institution
15

Id at, 569.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)
17
Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 568,
18
Donald H. J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in
Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 Vand.
L. Rev. 83, 87 (1986).
16

19

Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 581, 584.
4

with adequate facilities and treatment options, the individual and public benefits from the
protection afforded by that environment and treatment.20 By committing an individual who has a
mental illness and treating him with effective medication under its power of parens patriae and
police power, the state is able to ensure that the individual is receiving helpful treatment,
fulfilling the goals of our civil commitment system.21 This should also be the goal of forced
institutionalization under an SVP statute: to ensure the safety of the community while effectively
treating the committed individual22 in hopes of eliminating or controlling the reason for their
commitment to allow them to reenter society safely. On one hand the goal of civil commitment is
to keep the individual and society safe. This goal creates tension with the proposed dual purpose
of commitment (public safety and receiving treatment). These competing goals make the reality
of receiving effective treatment dim.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionally required treatment
standard. The standard for treatment of civilly committed individuals once they are
institutionalized was elucidated in Youngberg v. Romeo.23 In Youngberg, the Court held that the
proper standard for determining whether a state adequately had protected the rights of those
20
21

Manahan, supra n.7 at 7.
Id.

22

Although treatment does not eliminate sexual crime, research supports the view that treatment
can decrease the likelihood of future sex offenses and protect potential victims. However, given
the limitations in scientific knowledge and accuracy of outcome data, as well as the potential
high human costs of prognostic uncertainty, any commitment to a social project substituting
treatment for imprisonment of sexual aggressors must be accompanied by vigorous research.
Grossman, Are Sex Offenders Treatable? A Research Overview ,Psychiatric Services 1999. See
also, Olver, M. E., & Wong, S. P. (2009). Therapeutic Responses of Psychopathic Sexual
Offenders: Treatment Attrition, Therapeutic Change, and Long-Term Recidivism. 77 J. Consult.
Clin. Psychol. 328-336 (2009) (“Overall, the results suggest that given appropriate treatment
interventions, sex offenders with significant psychopathic traits can be retained in an institutional
treatment program and those showing therapeutic improvement can reduce their risk for both
sexual and violent recidivism”).
23
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,307 (1982).
5

civilly committed was whether the medical professionals at the facility in fact had exercised
professional judgment where the individual was committed.24 The Court found that qualified
professional judgment was entitled to a presumption of correctness and that liability could be
imposed only when a treatment decision represented such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment as to demonstrate that the decision had not been based on professional
judgment.25 The Court left the decision regarding what constituted accepted professional
judgment largely to the discretion of medical professionals and medical authorities, because
courts, judges, and juries are not in a position to second guess experts on matters on which they
are better informed.26 While the Court has recognized a range of procedural requirements that
protect the civil liberty interests of persons subject to civil commitment, it has also increasingly
given recognition to treatment and clinical rights of persons involuntarily committed to mental
health facilities.27 On the other hand, many legislatures and courts have focused only on the civil
liberty interests of persons subject to involuntary civil commitment,28 leaving the treatment
concerns to meet the minimum standards set out in Youngberg, creating competing goals for
civil commitment across state lines.
A major concern coming out of the court decisions and legislation regarding traditional
civil commitment is that those individuals that are seriously mentally ill may not be meeting the
commitment threshold (i.e. posing an imminent danger to the community) and are too mentally

24

Id. at 307.
Id.
26
Id.
27
see generally Monahan, Three Lingering Issues in Patient Rights, in PSYCHIATRIC
PATIENT RIGHTS AND PATIENT ADVOCACY: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE 264-65 (B.
Bloom & S. Asher eds. 1982) (examining the differences both in nature and success in advocacy
of procedural and treatment rights)
28
Hermann supra n. 18 at 106.
25
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ill to recognize that they need to consent to treatment.29 The Court has emphasized that civil
committees such as in the case of Youngberg v. Romeo, where Romeo was neither charged with
nor convicted of a crime, are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.30 This
creates a treatment dichotomy in which who that may have committed crimes because of their
mental illness do not receive the same treatment as those individuals that have been found to be a
danger to themselves or the community before their actions resulted in criminal sanctions.31 This
is the inherent problem that those committed under SVP statutes face. Some have committed
morally reprehensible crimes and some like Derrick S., are sympathetic characters that while
having a criminal conviction, are subjected to a broken system.32 They are individuals that need
access to mental health service yet do not appear to be receiving treatment with the end goal of
improving their mental health to be reintegrated into society. Some would say that the language
in Youngberg strongly suggests that there is no broad constitutional right to treatment for persons

29

David T. Simpson, Jr., Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Dangerousness Standard and
Its Problems, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 241, 241 (1984).
30
Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement
of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 319, 343 (2003).
31

The Kansas Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks recognized that, whereas civil commitment
under Kansas’s general civil commitment law for the mentally ill comported with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Foucha by requiring evidence of “mental illness,” Kansas v.
Hendrick, 521 U.S. 346,358 (1997): the KSVPA departed from Foucha by allowing civil
commitment based not on mental illness but rather on “antisocial personality features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities”, Zander, supra n. 8.
32
Derrik committed his sexual crime when he was a minor, the testing that can allow an
individual to be labeled treated with a low recidivism rate considers such factors as living in the
same home as a lover for at least two year (see Static –99R code form), considering that he was a
minor he was unable to meet this requirement and get a 1 instead of a 0 for this category. The
higher point value indicated on the Static 99 means a higher potential for reoffense.
7

involuntarily confined as dangerous and mentally impaired, at least where no acceptable
treatment exists or where they cannot be successfully treated for their afflictions.33
This treatment dichotomy can bee seen in the Supreme Court’s decision in Foucha v.
Louisiana.34 Terry Foucha was found guilty by reason of mental insanity and was civilly
committed to a facility.35 Doctors at the state facility had found that Foucha had an antisocial
personality disorder, a condition that is not a mental disease and is untreatable. The state
Supreme Court found that under Louisiana’s statutory scheme confinement of an insanity
acquittee based on dangerousness alone was allowed.36 In reversing Louisiana’s supreme court,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and ruled that potential dangerousness was not a
justification to retain a person found not guilty by reason of insanity if no mental illness was
present. The Court also held that, as a matter of due process, he was entitled to release when he
had recovered his sanity or was no longer dangerous.37 This would mean that the court does not
envision indefinite commitment under traditional civil commitment and that at least part of the
goal of civil commitment is to treat the mental illness since dangerousness was not enough to
keep Foucha committed. Individuals committed under SVP acts can be committed for “mental
abnormalities,” one of which is anti-social personality disorder, which is “notoriously difficult to
treat”38 and is “essentially a way of being.”39 The definition of antisocial personality disorder
highlights that the reason for which a sexually violent predator faces indefinite commitment is

33

Janus & Logan, supra n. 30 at 384.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 71 (1992).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Mayo Clinic, Antisocial Personality Disorder, available at accessed 11\19\12,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/antisocial-personalitydisorder/DS00829/DSECTION=treatments-and-drugs. (last accessed Nov. 19, 2012).
39
Id.
34
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because of the aspect of dangerousness. This suggests that states with SVP acts are not interested
in treating mental illness\conditions but instead focus on what may happen upon release.40 The
section below will clearly show that SVP statutes have a primarily to protect the public and not
to treat the committed individuals. States refer to SVPs as “the worst of the worst,”41 and
presenting dangers and risks to the community.42 The dual purpose of public protection and
treatment is not a reality.
II HISTORY AND VARIATIONS OF SVP ACTS IN THE US
In the United States there are 20 states that have adopted SVP statutes in addition to the
federal government.43 As of 2006, when only 17 states possessed SVP laws, over 4,500
individuals had been committed under their provisions with only 494 offenders having been
released once they were confined.44 This created a release rate of just under 11 percent of the

40

In State v. Randall, the ability to hold someone on dangerousness alone was upheld however,
ultimately, the court held that an insanity acquittee may be held in an institution as long as he/she
is still dangerous, to the extent the time does not exceed the maximum time that could have been
imposed if the acquittee had been sentenced to prison. State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d at 94,94
(Wis. 2d 1995) see also David L. Shaprio, Ethical Dilemmas for the Mental Health Professional:
Issues Raised by Recent Supreme Court Decisions 34 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1 (1997). This is clearly
different in the context of SVPs who are held after they have completed a full prison sentence for
their crimes.
41
“The worst of the worst” is the term used to describe Sexually Violent Predators by Riverside
County, California District Attorney Rod Pacheco. Keith Matheny, Areas Fear
Predators’ Releases, USA Today, Mar. 4, 2010, at 3A (outlining difficulties surrounding
supervised release of sexually violent predators).
42
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 (1994); N.Y. MHY Law § 10.01 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code §
71.09.010 (1992).
43
Dan Krauss, John McCabe & Joel Lieberman Dangerously Misunderstood: Representative
Jurors’ Reactions to Expert Testimony on Future Dangerousness in Sexually Violent Predator
Trial, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, July 25, 2011, at 1, available at
http://www.cgu.edu/pdffiles/sbos/krauss_dangerously_misunderstood.pdf
44
Kathy Gookin Comparison of State Laws Authorizing Involuntary Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators Washington State Institute for
Public Policy Aug. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf
9

committed population.45 Civil rights lawyers have argued, several states have held that SVP
statutes are an unconstitutional form of preventive detention, double jeopardy, and/or
punishment without due process. Two cases46 made it to the US Supreme Court and, despite
amicus briefs from the American Psychological Association in opposition, the Court has twice
accepted the constitutionality of the SVP statutes.47
One of the first of these SVP laws to be enacted and reviewed by the Supreme Court was
enacted by Kansas.48 LeRoy Hendricks, who had been convicted and sentenced for sexually
molesting children, challenged this statue in 1996.49 Hendricks challenged the Kansas SVP
statute on grounds of due process. In Kansas v. Hendricks,50 the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas
delivering the opinion of the court, held that: the Act's definition of “mental abnormality”
satisfied substantive due process requirements for civil commitment, the Act did not establish
“criminal” proceedings, and involuntary confinement pursuant to Act was not punitive, thus
precluding finding of any double jeopardy or ex post facto violation.51
With the constitutionality of the Kansas SVP statute being upheld, similar acts have been
enacted in 19 other states.52 The programs in these states, however, are not identical, this
analysis concerns itself with the programs in Kansas, Texas, California, and New Jersey.
45

This number was arrived at using data from the previous sentence, comparing the release of
494 individuals in comparison to 4500 individuals committed under SVP statutes. The actual
number is 10.978%.
46
This refers to Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane. Kansas v. Crane, further affirmed the
constitutionality of the SVP laws, and allowed a broader interpretation of volitional control than
Hendricks, by clarifying that complete inability to control behavior is not required (Kansas v.
Crane, 534 US 407 (2002).
47
Frances, Allen, and Shoba Sreenivasan. Sexually Violent Predator Statutes: The Clinical/Legal
Interface. Psychiatric Times 25.14 (2008).
48
Zander, supra n. 8 at 22.
49
Id.
50
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
51
52

Id.
Kraus, supra, note 4.
10

Although the predominant motivation for SVP commitment laws is incapacitation, states
uniformly promise treatment as an ancillary purpose. Indeed, it is this “treatment” purpose that
marks the high-security, long-term incapacitation characteristic of SVP regimes as non-punitive,
and insulates them from constitutional challenge. Yet, in practice, the promised treatment most
often goes unredeemed. 53 These four states highlight the differences that have arisen in the
formulation of SVP treatment programs. These differences are due in part to the deference given
to the states in the formulation of their SVP statutes and from the Supreme Court decision in
Hendricks set forth an imprecise constitutional standard on treatment.54
A. THE KANSAS STATUTE
In Kansas, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) is a sex offender who has a mental
abnormality or personality disorder and a charge or conviction for a sexually violent offense.55
SVPs are different than other sex offenders because they are at a higher risk to re-offend if their
mental abnormality or personality disorder is left untreated.56 In Kansas an individual committed
under the SVP act is housed at Larned State Hospital.57 There are seven steps of the treatment
program including five inpatient and two outpatient phases.58 There is no time limit for
completion of each phase.59 The offender must meet the predetermined requirements of the phase
to advance.60 Since the program’s genesis 16 years ago,61only two people have earned final

53

Janus, supra note 30 at 321.
Zander, supra note 8 at 24.
55
Kansas Dept. Of Corrections, January 2011, available at
http://www.doc.ks.gov/victimservices/brochures/SVP%20Brochure%20Jan%202011.pub.pdf.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Kansa Dept. of Corrections. supra n. 55
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
As of November 2010.
54
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release, according to state records, 16 people earned conditional release or were released by a
state judge for other reasons and 15 others died in the program.62
Compared with the other states examined here,63 the Kansas model is relatively
straightforward. This is because the Kansas program for custody and treatment is more heavily
dependent on the Department of Corrections for its day-to-day operations64 than any of the six
programs.65 As a practical matter, the treatment program, located within the Larned Correctional
Mental Health Facility, relies on the DOC for facility security, food, transportation, and medical
care – virtually everything with the exception of delivery of the treatment program.66
B. THE TEXAS STATUTE
In Texas, the SVP statute was deemed needed because the existing involuntary
commitment provisions of Subtitle C, Title 7,67 were inadequate to address the risk of repeated
predatory behavior that sexually violent predators pose to society. The legislature further found
that treatment modalities for sexually violent predators are different from the traditional
treatment modalities for persons appropriate for involuntary commitment. Thus, the legislature
found that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term supervision and treatment of sexually

62

Larry Seward, Is the Kansas Program treating sexual predators or making them worse?,
Kansas City Action News Article, Nov. 3, 2010, available
at http://www.kshb.com/dpp/news/crime/is-ks-program-treating-or-perverting-sexualpredators#ixzz2AiQVb94Y
63
Analysis relied on is by Andrew Harris and his report cited below
64
Andrew Harris, A Prospective Analysis of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
Policies, (Doctoral Dissertation), Robert F. Wagner School of Public Justice, New York, NY,
Sept. 2003
65
The six programs reviewed in the study were Wisconsin, Kansas, California, Florida,
Washington, Minnesota.
66
Harris. supra n. 64 .
67
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 574.001-.203(1999).
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violent predators was necessary and in the interest of the state. 68 Unlike all of the other states
that have SVP acts, Texas’ program is focused exclusively on the use of outpatient treatment and
supervision as an alternative to the route of inpatient commitment.69 The individual is held until
trial on the petition for civil commitment. There is no probable cause hearing built into the Texas
scheme,70 because the statute does not anticipate detaining the respondent in an inpatient facility.
Thus, the basic loss of liberty inherent in a typical inpatient commitment is not present.71 In this
sense, the Texas statute is at the forefront of developments in this area of the law nationally and
provides another option for those states considering the enactment of laws for civil commitment
of sexually violent predators.72
Compared to the release of individuals that are committed under the Kansas program, the
treatment and release of individuals under the Texas program is much higher. As of October 1,
2011, there were 224 sexually violent predators that have been committed under Health & Safety
Code Chapter 841.73 Of the 224 that were committed, 125 reside in the community and 99 are
awaiting release from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice into the treatment program. 74
Furthermore, the Texas law has attempted to develop an effective balance in the area of the civil
commitment of the sexually violent predator. Outpatient supervision and treatment in all
practical terms can lend itself to greater actual psychotherapeutic intervention and some

68

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann., § 841 (1999).
Rahn Bailey, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: A Unique Texas Approach,
30 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law,525, 525–32 (2002).
70
Tex. Health & Safety Code, supra, n. 68.
71
Bailey, supra, n. 69 at 526.
72
Id.
73
Texas Civil Commitment-Outpatient Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program (OSVPTP)
Health & Safety Code, Chapter 841, available at http://www.ovsom.texas.gov/docs/Texas-CivilCommitment-OutpatientSVP.pdf.
74
Texas Civil Commitment, supra n. 73.
69
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psychiatrists question the validity and effectiveness of treatment during incarceration.75 These
higher release rates tend to show that the Texas program’s course of treatment affords the
committed individual a greater access to mental health services that actually could aid in treating
the conditions that caused these individuals to offend in the first place and to prevent re-offense.
The statistics from Texas have shown that as of October 1, 2011, none of the SVPs committed to
the program have been charged with or convicted of a new sexual crime,76which represents a 0
percent sexual recidivism rate.77
C. THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE
Involuntary commitment of sexual offenders to state hospitals in California dates back to
the early 20th century.78 The “sexual psychopath laws” were indeterminate criminal sentences
that allowed for commitment to state psychiatric hospitals for as long as the individual was
deemed a threat to society.79 The purpose was to help sexual offenders by curing them in a
shorter time than they would serve in prisons, and to protect society against release of sexual
offenders who had not been cured within the maximum incarceration sentence.80 In California,
the Sexual Psychopath Law was replaced in favor of the Mentally Disordered Sexual Offender
(MDSO) Law81 in 1944, with the MDSO law being repealed in January 1982. 82

75

Bailey, supra n. 69, 53.
This is not to say that there were not instances of the individuals re-offending, 38% percent, 68
SVPs, have committed a non-sexual offense and been returned to prison.
77
Texas Civil Commitment, supra n. 73.
78
Deidre M D’Orazio et al., The California Sexually Violent Predator Statute: History,
Description & Areas for Improvement, Cal. Coalition on Sexual Offending, Jan. 2009, at 5,
available at http://ccoso.org/papers/CCOSO%20SVP%20Paper.pdf
79
Id.
80
Id. D’Orazio, supra¸ n. 78; see also, Dangerous Sexual Offenders: A Task Force Report of the
American Psychiatric Association (1st ed. 1999).
81
The MDSO statute provided for the diversion from prison to forensic state psychiatric
hospitals of those individuals whose sexual crimes were deemed to be due to a mental disorder.
The treatment goal was to reduce risk to such an extent that the individual was felt to be safe for
76
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Developing out of this attention to a subgroup of criminals, the California Legislature passed the
SVP Act as a component of the Welfare and Institutions Code83 to address the concern expressed
in the preamble of the legislation; specifically, according to the state, “a small but extremely
dangerous (number of) sexually violent predators exist.”84 California’s SVP statute was closely
modeled after that of the first state to enact an SVP statute, Washington state (1990). Persons
committed as SVPs have been previously convicted of specified sex offenses against one or more
victims and have been determined to have a diagnosed mental disorder that makes it likely that
they will engage in sexually violent predatory behavior upon release into the community.85
Unlike all of the other statutes, except for Texas, which only has an outpatient program, an SVP
in California cannot be held for more than two years, unless a subsequent extended commitment
is obtained from the court by the granting of a new petition for commitment.86
In terms of treatment, California again differs slightly from other state statutes as the
statute focuses on treating the prevalence of re-offense as oppose to curing the sexual offender.87
The program focuses around this relapse prevention idea and focuses on "offense specific"
treatment components; that is, treatment components will be geared toward the identification and

release. See generally Sturgeon, V. H. & Taylor, J., Report of a 5-year Follow-up Study of
Mentally Disordered Sexual Offenders Released From Atascadero State Hospital in 1973Crim.
Justice Journal, 4, 31-74 (1980). California’s statutes have generally acknowledged the
dangerousness of these individuals but sought to provide treatment in order to reduce recidivism
rates.
82
D’Orazio, supra, n. 78 at 7.
83
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code§ 6600 (1995).
84
Id.
85
California Department of State Hospitals, http://www.dsh.ca.gov/forensics/FAQs.asp (last
accessed Nov. 19, 2012); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601 (1995). Note another differing
criteria for commitment as compared to other states in this paper is that in California the SVP
statute only applies to those individuals that are already confined to state prison
86
California Department of State Hospitals, supra n. 85
87
Id.
15

modification of risk factors for sexual offending.88 Like other states with SVP statues, California
utilizes a phase system.89 There are four inpatient phases; each with specific requirements and
phase five is an outpatient supervised patient reintegration program. 90 Compared to the release
rates in Kansas and the zero percent recidivism rate of the Texas program, California’s results
seem to fall somewhere in the middle. Since the program’s genesis, 95 of the 558 total
committed SVPs have earned final release.91 This is above the national average (11 percent),
accounting for a release rate of just over 17 percent.92 There has been no study specifically on the
95 individuals that have been reintegrated into society. However, there was a study regarding the
treatment model that is employed in California. The Sexual Offender Treatment and Evaluation
Project93 looked at the relapse prevention model that is currently incorporated into California’s
SVP treatment program. 94 A positive treatment effect was revealed when the treatment groups
were separated into two groups, those who “got it”95 and those who were assessed to have failed
to meet the treatment objectives.96 The “got it” group had recidivism rates 50 percent less than
those assessed to have not met the treatment program objectives.97 These results98 are not
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dispositive but in combination with the results of the Texas outpatient treatment program, tend to
show that a relapse prevention model and outpatient program where individuals can work
through phases and are not committed for indefinite amounts of time can have positive effects on
recidivism rates. Focusing the treatment program on relapse prevention and outpatient programs
where the SVP is exposed to real life triggers has had a positive correlation on recidivism rates
and should be taken into account when reviewing the mental health services provided to the
individual subject to the SVP statute.
D. THE NEW JERSEY STATUTE
The statue in New Jersey, The Sexually Violent Predator Act,99 defines a sexually violent
predator as an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment.100 To qualify
as a SVP, an individual need not suffer from “mental illness,” as defined for purposes of general
civil commitment101 instead, he must have a mental abnormality or personality disorder that may
or may not constitute “mental illness,” coupled with a criminal conviction or finding of legal
insanity or trial incompetence.102 The origins of the New Jersey statute come from its traditional
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civil commitment statute that was expanded103 in 1994 and upheld after In the Matter of D.C.104
In affirming the commitment, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the new definition of
mental illness was clearly intended to apply to released sexual offenders like D.C. who needed to
be involuntarily detained for public safety.105
It is through the Department of Health Services that the committed individuals under the
statute in New Jersey receive treatment at the Sexual Treatment Unit (STU). The treatment
provided in the New Jersey facility follows the relapse prevention model, with phase
designations.106 In order to regain his liberty,107 even conditionally, the ex-offender must
establish that he has been successfully treated for the mental abnormality or personality disorder
that was the basis for his confinement to the STU.108 The primary mental health treatment
provided to committees is a form of group therapy administered in “process groups,”
supplemented by psycho-educational “modules” devoted to topics such as victim empathy,
relapse prevention, and arousal reconditioning.109
Recent data show that from 1999 through the end of March 2012, only 69 of the 580 men
committed to the STU (less than 12 percent) were discharged to the community, in most cases
subject to stringent conditions including parole supervision and community-based therapy. This
release rate falls just below the national average and it appears from the data that the majority of
103
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the men that were released did not sexually reoffend as they would have been transferred back to
the facility.110 These numbers may seem encouraging and along the lines of the result seen in
Texas’s with regard to recidivism rates however, more than half of the men that were released to
the community were committed within the first three years that the facility was open.111 It was
only after between ten and 13 years they were able to receive enough therapy to receive a phase
designation for four or five and gains final release.112
The treatment provided under the New Jersey statute appears to be more extensive than in
Kansas but the numbers of release and recidivism seem to suggest that it is less effective113 than
the treatment received in California and Texas. What one can take away from the review of these
statutes is that they provide a wide array of treatment, both effective and ineffective. More than
one statue’s primary goal and seemingly only goal is protection of the public. The reality of
treatment is overlooked if it means these individuals will not be released, preventing them from
ever reoffending.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF BIOETHICS AND MENTAL ILLNESS
The revolutionary import of bioethics was to shift moral agency away from physicians to
patients, and to introduce moral perspectives from outside of medicine.114 In recent years there
has been little focus on how bioethical principles should be used to intervene into mental health
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services,115 in particular there has been virtually no attention given to the ethical implications of
the lack of treatment given to the individuals convicted under SVP statutes. While mental illness
is not completely missing from the public discussions, literature, and texts of bioethics, it tends
to be marginalized much as mental health is in relation to physical health care.116
One scholar suggests that the reasons that ethical issues associated with mental illness
have generally been neglected in literature and texts of the discipline of bioethics centers around
three main issues: changes in the delivery system of mental health services, conflicting ethical
theories, and finally the stigma that is associated with mental illness. 117
The delivery of mental health services was dramatically changed after World War II and
continued through the 1970s, with the deinstitutionalization of persons with mental illness and
the introduction of community-based outpatient treatment.118 The deinstitutionalization was
driven in part by court rulings and in part by emergence of the community mental health
movement, which challenged the therapeutic efficacy of hospitalization in the process of
treatment and recovery from mental illness and the emergence of mental health advocacy
groups.119 Deinstitutionalization changed the preeminent model of delivery services into a
community based treatment approach that involves a number of different medical services
provided by a variety of medical professionals.120 It is this movement toward a community-based
model that has left bioethics without a seat at the table. Bioethics moved from the fringes of the
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academic world to the forefront by pursuing institution-based opportunities.121 With the
movement away from treating mental health services in these types of institutions, bioethicists do
not have a platform to comment on the state of mental illness.
The second contributing factor to the lack of scholarship on the ethics of mental illness is
the conflicting ethical principles that could be applied in this area. The conflict largely centers
around the positive and negative implications of applying a paternalistic approach and relying on
autonomy. Autonomy is commonly understood to be the principle that independent actions and
choices of the individual should not be constrained by others.122 Paternalism on the other hand,
in particular medical paternalism, is the interference with the autonomy of patients for their own
clinical benefit, and was an accepted ethical norm in the history of Western medical ethics and
was widespread in clinical practice.123
Due to the nature of mental illness and the potential for diminished decision-making
capacity, autonomy tends to become a contentious issue, rather than ta worthwhile principle in
bioethical discussions.124 The emphasis that autonomy places on rational decision making as the
necessary and sufficient condition for autonomous moral action becomes a conceptual barrier to
engagement with the wider range of issues facing the mentally ill because many argue they are
often not rational individuals.125 It can be argued that the coercive treatment of psychiatric
patients only seemingly conﬂicts with considerations of autonomy, namely in all cases where
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patients are not capable of making autonomous decisions126 however, given the paternalistic
nature of the commitment statutes being discussed, it is clear that society’s goal is inherently
paternalistic. Accordingly there are occasions when people should be treated paternalistically in
the interest of others and if it means that the paternalistic intervention could make the individual
better: allowing him or her to make autonomous choices.127 The tension between these two
approaches creates a divide where bioethicists do not have a unified voice to speak on the issue.
Compounding the issue of autonomy versus paternalism is the stigma that is often
associated with mental illness and the public response. Even with the evolution of other theories
of bioethics (feminism, caustrity, narrative) there has not been an increased amenability to the
study of mental illness from a bioethics framework.128People with mental illness are often seen
by the general public as lazy, as individuals that can help themselves yet do not do so.129 Stigma
is also a contributing factor in the chronic underfunding of public mental health services and in
the disparities of coverage in private insurance plans.130 The stigma attaches most directly to
persons with mental illness, but there is a wider stigmatizing effect on people who are associated
with persons with mental illness.131 This stigma presents the final barrier that bioethics must
overcome in order to become more engaged in the discussion of mental illness. As the scholar
Janet Nelson aptly puts it “mental illness, despite the many recent advances in scientific understanding and medical treatment, retains about it the musty and unpleasant aura of the asylum—
and no one, from bioethicists to the mentally ill themselves, cares to visit that place if it can be
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avoided.”132
IV. BIOETHICS, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND THE SVP TREATMENT PARADIGM
In order for bioethics to become engaged in mental health issues it must first overcome the
stigma that is involved in treating societally unpopular individuals.133 Bioethics is a field that
answers difficult and often unpopular questions, looking at the rights, obligations, privileges and
relationships of people.134 To start to overcome the stigma that is associated with mental illness,
bioethics can begin by looking at mental illness through the lens of public health and health
disparity prevalent in developing countries. This acts as a way for bioethicists to begin a
dialogue, a key step to overcoming the stigma of treating the mentally ill and discussing their
conditions. Traditionally speaking, bioethicists tend to focus their attention on those areas where
they can demonstrate how to exercise virtue.135 The mentally ill are a group that suffers and their
suffering often goes unnoticed, this is an area where bioethics and bioethicist have made a
difference in the past and clearly fits the model for discussion.136
By overcoming the stigma and asserting its presence in the filed of mental illness,
bioethicists can develop a new understanding of autonomy that can greatly benefit the mentally
ill. Autonomy should move away from the focus on the rational aspect of the definition and
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instead seek to empower137 the individual with the power to be educated about and make choices
regarding their own mental health treatment. This concept includes certain positive rights such as
having decision-making power, access to information and resources, and a range of options from
which to make choices and a continuous conversation about those choices. 138
Even those people with severe mental illnesses, including some people who are
experiencing active psychotic episodes, are not so impaired that they are incapable
of understanding a proposed medical treatment.139 They might refuse treatment for their
psychotic symptoms on the basis of unlikely or even obviously false belief that they are not ill.140
Such beliefs do not necessarily make them incapable of comprehending the proposed
treatment.141 Providing that through discussion a severely mentally ill person can have an
understanding of the consequences of refusing treatment, this furthers the ultimate goal of
promoting autonomous decisions. This new understanding of autonomy helps to ensure that
someone who refuses treatment does so because refusing treatment is consistent with his own
goals and desires. Provided that the individual is not a danger to himself or others, his mental
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illness should not prevent him from deciding what course of treatment, if any, he wishes to
pursue.
Bioethics should look to areas where it can become involved in a way that has been
successful in the past. Bioethics took a firm stance in the early years of mental illness treatment
because of the harsh methods used in institutional facilities, the lack of consent of the patients
housed in those facilities and the overall mistreatment that institutionalized patients had to deal
with in the early years of mental health treatment.142 Following this model would mean that a
bioethicist would sit on the board of facility that treats the mentally ill or would be allowed
access to that facility in order to make ethical determinations. The civil commitment process
creates a place where bioethicist can follow a model that works. In particular the bioethicist
could look at the treatment of an underserved (although unpopular population) of sex offenders.
Examining the treatment and the facilities where SVP are committed would allow bioethicists to
focus on the suffering inherent in being committed in a system that requires an individual to
move through treatment modules. In order to move through those phases or treatment modules
they have to have treatment, yet, the treatment they receive is sub-standard and they become
trapped in this seemingly never ending cycle.
A commitment facility would provide fertile ground to further the discussion on the ethical
treatment of committed SVPs. Given that the dual purpose for commitment under SVP statutes is
community protection and to aid the individual, providing adequate mental health services will
allow both goals to be accomplished. Treating these individuals of their mental afflictions
reduces the risk to the community and serves the goals of paternalism. While the goals of
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paternalism may not have the best interest of the patient in mind, they do have the interest of
society at large. Allowing this balance between SVP treatment and public safety is essential to
instituting a new treatment model. 143 When a real tragedy occurs, the media and politicians will
interpret the tragedy as a failure to use the SVP tool broadly enough. Moves will be made to
broaden the SVP net.144 The public needs assurances that allowing for variations in treatment
will not put themselves or their children at risk and a bioethicist needs room to encourage
changes to the treatment system, making the balancing of these competing goals paramount to
ensuring that SVP acts are not broadened and treatment does not suffer.
While there are arguments that treatment will not work for sex offenders, as noted
previously in this paper, there is not conclusive evidence on either side145 and the effectiveness
of treatment is highly controversial.146 However, research generally indicates that rehabilitative
programs can help sex offenders control their impulses and reduce their likelihood of
reoffending.147 Specifically, studies indicate that the recidivism rate for sex offenders receiving
treatment was nineteen percent, compared to a twenty-seven percent rate for nontreated sex offenders.148 For some particular sexual afflictions (paraphilia and pedophilia) there
143
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is evidence that a relapse prevention model can reduce rates for recidivism.149 This would
provide a place where bioethics can encourage change. Under the theory of autonomy, if an
individual is being placed in a facility under the guise of receiving treatment, they should be
allowed to have access to therapy for those afflictions if there is evidence that it will help. These
individuals should not be placed in a system that becomes punitive because research on sexual
deviance is not complete. Bioethicists should promote the theory of non-malfeasance, to do no
further harm to the committed populations.
There will inevitably be those individuals who refuse treatment. Under the current system
in place in many states, this refusal may because certain treatment programs require that
offenders recount their sexual offenses, which in turn leads treatment providers, the judicial
system, and the public to believe that the offenders continue to contemplate sexually violent acts
and are still dangerous.150 It could become the bioethicist role to advocate for the committed SVP
that engaging in therapy should not result in a punitive outcomes because treatment appears to be
at least minimally effective, encouraging treatment achieves the statutory and constitutional aims
of protecting society and caring for mentally ill persons.151 Allowing a committed SVP who
would otherwise refuse treatment due to fear of additional criminal sentencing or a longer stay in
an SVP facility to choose an outpatient treatment method or treatment with a certain amount of
privacy protection152 would likely increase treatment participation. Appealing to the SVP
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committee as an autonomous decision maker instead of a criminal heightens the likelihood of the
SVP committee choosing treatment.
Finally, there would likely be arguments against providing treatment because it costs too
much. However, the Texas program proves that treatment can prevent recidivism and the cost per
individual in the Texas program is 17,000, which is 77,000 less than the national average.153 The
cost of the SVP system is not only witnessed in providing care in an institutionalized
atmosphere, but is evidenced in budget cuts in certain states. These budget cuts, in an attempt to
protect the public by keeping SVPs from reentering society have come at a high price. Some
states have taken measures like reducing the number of probation officers and cutting funds to
domestic violence and sexual violence prevention programs.154 As more and more resources
pour into SVP programs, the distortion in policy and resource allocation will become more and
more severe. Society will suffer because of the resource drain, and victims will suffer as more
resources are drawn away from programs that address the great bulk of sexual violence in the
community.155
The cost of providing treatment can be defended under bioethical principles regarding
access to healthcare, beneficence, and a sense of justice. If SVP statues want to have provisions
regarding treatment of the individual then they should have to subscribe to a duty of fairness and
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give to each committed SVP that treatment that the individual deserves. By creating an
outpatient program, which will cost lest than institutionalization, focus can be on individual
triggers and therapy. This then allows states that are considering budget cuts in other areas to
continue to employ corrections officers and provide funding to sexual violence prevention
programs. This cost shifting then becomes mutually beneficial: allowing each state to treat the
afflicted SVP while cutting its budget and potentially seeing the zero percent recidivism Texas
has seen using this out-patient approach.
CONCLUSION
Bioethics should focus on individuals committed under SVP statutes in order to draw
awareness to the lack of treatment they receive. Treatment should be improved and varied in
these programs, as it would lead to lower cost and likely a lower rate of recidivism. Following
the Texas model would allow for patient autonomy while still serving the interest of the state by
protecting citizens. Allowing a new understanding of autonomy to take root would likely greatly
advance the conditions within SVP facilities and make great steps toward allowing both the
mentally ill and sexually violent predators to choose and receive treatment to become productive
members of society.

29

